The Flagship Programme
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Governance, phases, the full project inventory by category, and how it's actually financed — with the investment and jobs totals presented as the range they genuinely are, not a single cherry-picked number.
How CPEC is governed — and how that has changed
CPEC began as an MOU signed 5 July 2013 in Beijing, run through a CPEC Secretariat inside Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, with China's National Development and Reform Commission as counterpart. On 5 October 2019, a standalone CPEC Authority was created by presidential ordinance to take over coordination. ARY News, on the ordinance → By December 2024, Pakistan's Senate Standing Committee on Planning was told the Authority had become "dysfunctional" and that the Ministry recommended repealing the Act; the government's own site now again describes itself as the "CPEC Secretariat," confirming a de facto reversion to the pre-2019 model. Dawn, on the Senate committee proceedings → This institutional history is not narrated on cpec.gov.pk's own pages — it comes from Senate committee reporting — but the current branding on the government's own site corroborates that the reversion happened.
The Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), with Joint Working Groups reporting into it on energy, transport, Gwadar, security, industrial cooperation and more, is the top governance body. Selected meetings:
| JCC | Date | Notes | Source |
|---|
| 1st | 27 Aug 2013 | Islamabad | — |
| 2nd | 19 Feb 2014 | Beijing | — |
| 3rd | 27 Aug 2014 | Beijing | — |
| 4th | 25 Mar 2015 | Beijing | — |
| 5th | 12 Nov 2015 | Karachi | — |
| 6th | 29 Dec 2016 | Beijing — approved the Dhabeji SEZ | — |
| 8th | 20 Dec 2018 | Beijing | cpec.gov.pk → |
| 10th | 23 Sep 2021 | Videoconference | cpec.gov.pk → |
| 11th | 27 Oct 2022 | Islamabad, videoconference | cpec.gov.pk → |
| 12th (Special) | 11 Jul 2023 | Beijing | cpec.gov.pk → |
| 14th | 26 Sep 2025 | Beijing — CPEC Phase-II officially launched | cpec.gov.pk → |
| 15th (planned) | May 2026 | Islamabad, timed to the 75th anniversary | cpec.gov.pk → |
From Phase-I to Phase-II
The Corridor's first decade (roughly 2013–2020) was infrastructure- and energy-heavy. At the 14th JCC (September 2025), the two governments formally launched Phase-II, structured around "Five Corridors" — Growth, Innovation, Green Development, Livelihood, and Regional Connectivity — explicitly mapped onto Pakistan's own "URAAN Pakistan" national framework. CPEC Secretariat → "CPEC 2.0" is the shorthand used in speeches and commentary; the government's own term is "Phase-II."
The project inventory, by category
Energy — 15 completed projects add roughly 13,200 MW of generation capacity plus a 4,000 MW HVDC evacuation line; the government's own FAQ page separately cites "14 completed energy projects with $15 billion investment." CPEC Secretariat →
| Project | Capacity | Location |
|---|
| Sahiwal Coal-fired Power Plant | 1,320 MW | Sahiwal, Punjab |
| Port Qasim Coal-fired Power Plant | 1,320 MW | Karachi |
| China Hub Coal Power Project | 1,320 MW | Hub, Balochistan |
| Engro Thar Coal Power Project | 660 MW | Thar, Sindh |
| Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park | 400–600 MW | Bahawalpur |
| UEP Wind Farm | 100 MW | Jhimpir, Thatta |
| Karot Hydropower Project | 720 MW | AJK/Punjab border |
| Suki Kinari Hydropower Project | 884 MW | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| Matiari–Lahore ±660kV HVDC Transmission Line | 4,000 MW evacuation capacity | Sindh to Punjab |
A Chinese Embassy factsheet cites "more than 8,000 MW" of power generation contributed under CPEC — noticeably lower than the roughly 13,200 MW total of completed projects on CPEC's own list. This is most likely an accounting-window difference (Chinese-financed capacity within a specific period, versus the full list), not a contradiction, but a single reconciled figure was not found in either government's public materials.
Transport infrastructure — completed projects include the KKH Phase-II Havelian–Thakot section, the Multan–Sukkur motorway, Lahore's Orange Line Metro, and an 820km cross-border fibre-optic cable. The largest item still in the pipeline is the ML-1 railway upgrade (1,733 km, Peshawar to Karachi), whose cost has moved several times — originally estimated near $8.2–10 billion, more recently cited at approximately $6.8 billion — and which the Pakistan Economic Survey 2024-25 still describes as "under consultation," meaning it has not reached financial close. Business Recorder →
Special Economic Zones — four zones are at an advanced stage:
| SEZ | Location | Size | Notes |
|---|
| Rashakai SEZ | Nowshera, KP | 1,000 acres (Phase-I: 247) | China Road & Bridge Corp. + KP govt, 30-year concession; development cost cited at US$128 million |
| Dhabeji SEZ | Thatta, Sindh | 1,530 acres | 20-year PPP concession via Sindh Economic Zones Management Co. |
| Bostan SEZ | Pishin, Balochistan | 1,000 acres (Phase-I: 200) | Nine target industries including fruit processing and halal food |
| Allama Iqbal Industrial City | Faisalabad, Punjab | Not published | Cited by CPEC's own site as "at an advanced stage" |
Gwadar — the port and its Free Zone (more than 20 registered enterprises), a new international airport, a 1.2 MGD desalination plant, an Eastbay Expressway, a technical/vocational institute, and the 300-bed Pakistan-China Friendship Hospital are all completed; a coal-fired power project and expanded desalination capacity are underway. CPEC Secretariat →
How it's actually financed
The financing structure is more varied than "Chinese loans" as shorthand suggests. Energy projects were mostly built under an Independent Power Producer model: Chinese state banks (China Development Bank, China Exim Bank) lent to the private Chinese sponsor companies against their own project balance sheets, not as sovereign Pakistani debt. Infrastructure projects, by contrast, were financed through government-to-government concessional loans — commonly cited at 2–2.5% interest over 20–25-year terms, from China Exim Bank and the Silk Road Fund, sometimes alongside the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
There is no single, officially reconciled total-investment figure for CPEC. Recent Pakistani and Chinese sources have separately cited $25.4 billion / 236,000 jobs (December 2024), $25.93 billion / 261,000 jobs (a later Chinese Embassy figure timed to the 75th anniversary), and a cumulative framework commitment as high as $62 billion — each counting somewhat different things (realised investment vs. total planned commitment) at different points in time. This page presents the range rather than a single number for that reason. On jobs specifically: a Planning Commission estimate of roughly 800,000 jobs over 15 years is a projection, not a realised figure, and should not be read as one.
For readers who want the fullest primary detail: CPEC's Long Term Plan (2017–2030) is the foundational planning document, and CPEC's own working paper on employment is the most authoritative single source specifically on jobs — both are PDF documents on cpec.gov.pk best read directly rather than through secondary summary. Long Term Plan, PDF → Employment Outlook working paper, PDF →
