Turkiye and Pakistan describe their relationship as a 'brotherly' strategic partnership grounded in shared history, religion and mutual diplomatic support (notably on Kashmir and Cyprus), institutionalized through the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) chaired by the two heads of government/state. The relationship has deepened substantially since the mid-2010s in defense-industrial cooperation (MILGEM corvettes, T129 helicopter negotiations complicated by US engine export licensing) and has more recently expanded into a trilateral axis with Azerbaijan; trade, while growing, remains far below the two sides' stated $5 billion target and is Turkiye's most underdeveloped major-partner economic relationship relative to the political closeness of the two states.
Turkiye and Pakistan describe their relationship as a 'brotherly' strategic partnership grounded in shared history, religion and mutual diplomatic support (notably on Kashmir and Cyprus), institutionalized through the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) chaired by the two heads of government/state. The relationship has deepened substantially since the mid-2010s in defense-industrial cooperation (MILGEM corvettes, T129 helicopter negotiations complicated by US engine export licensing) and has more recently expanded into a trilateral axis with Azerbaijan; trade, while growing, remains far below the two sides' stated $5 billion target and is Turkiye's most underdeveloped major-partner economic relationship relative to the political closeness of the two states.
Embassies: Turkiye maintains its embassy in Islamabad plus a Consulate-General in Karachi and honorary consulates in Lahore, Peshawar, Sialkot and Faisalabad. Pakistan maintains its embassy in Ankara, a Consulate-General in Istanbul, and an honorary consulate in Izmir — one of the denser reciprocal diplomatic footprints Pakistan maintains with any country.
Pakistan-Turkiye relations are amongst Pakistan's most institutionalized bilateral relationships, anchored by the High Level Cooperation Council established in 2009 and upgraded to the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), which has now held seven sessions with rotating hosting between heads of state/government. Visits are frequent and high-level, including multiple Erdogan visits to Pakistan and reciprocal Pakistani visits to Turkiye, alongside foreign-minister-level exchanges. Since 2024 the bilateral relationship has been further amplified through a trilateral summit format with Azerbaijan (Astana, July 2024; Lachin, May 2025), reflecting an ambition to extend the partnership into a regional strategic axis. Cooperation also extends to counter-terrorism coordination, including a joint operation resulting in the arrest of an ISIS-linked individual holding Turkish nationality along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
| Agreement | Date | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) framework | 2009 (established); upgraded from High Level Cooperation Council | Apex bilateral institutional mechanism, chaired at head of state/government level, that has produced successive joint declarations (6th session declaration: 'Towards an Ever-Closer Strategic Partnership'; 7th session declaration, Feb 2025: 'Further deepening, diversifying, and institutionalizing the strategic partnership'). |
| Pakistan-Turkiye Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) | 2022-08 (signed after 19 rounds of negotiation) | Pakistan granted market access on 261 tariff lines to Turkiye; Turkiye offered concessions on 130 tariff lines, as a stepping stone toward a full FTA. |
| Pakistan-Turkiye Free Trade Agreement (FTA) | entered into force May 1, 2023 | Trade-in-goods agreement targeting elimination of tariffs on roughly 85% of trade lines; negotiations launched in Ankara in October 2015 following the 4th HLSCC session (Islamabad, Feb 2015); services and investment chapters reportedly still under discussion per Pakistan Business Council analysis. |
| 24 agreements/MOUs signed at 7th HLSCC session | 2025-02 | Covered defense, mining, energy and other sectors; a joint declaration was among the 24 documents — full itemized list not independently verified from primary text in sources reviewed. |
| Joint Statement, Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan Trilateral Meeting | 2024-07 and 2025-05 (two summits) | Establishes a trilateral strategic-partnership track alongside the core bilateral relationship. |
Bilateral trade reached a historic high in 2024 at roughly $1.4 billion (Turkish figures), still far short of the long-standing $5 billion target both governments have repeatedly reaffirmed, most recently at the February 2025 HLSCC session. The trade relationship is structurally imbalanced in Turkiye's favor at the aggregate level per Turkish statistics, though Pakistan's exports (largely textiles) have grown. The 2022 PTA and the FTA in force since May 2023 were explicitly designed to narrow this gap, but analysts (e.g., the Pakistan Business Council) note the FTA remains only a partial trade-in-goods agreement, with the two sides still negotiating expanded coverage and sensitive-sector treatment.
| Year | Trade volume | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $602.9M | Trading Economics/OEC (Pakistan exports to Turkiye $352.1M + Pakistan imports from Turkiye $250.8M, per Pakistan-side trade data) |
| 2024 | $1400M | Turkish government statements (President Erdogan, reported via Yeni Safak/AGBI) — total bilateral trade volume, described as a historic high, up nearly 30% year-on-year |
| 2024 | $1159.84M | OEC/Turkish trade data — sum of Turkiye's exports to Pakistan ($918.03M) and Pakistan's exports to Turkiye ($241.81M); differs from the round $1.4bn figure cited by Turkish officials, indicating some inconsistency between political statements and disaggregated trade-data sources |
Investment: Turkish investment in Pakistan includes Zorlu Energy Pakistan (established 2006), which built and operates a 56.4 MW wind farm at Jamphir, Hyderabad (completed 2013), and has discussed further 200 MW solar and 100 MW wind investments. Turkish construction conglomerates (e.g., İç İçtaş/İç Holding) have expressed interest in Pakistani infrastructure, motorway and energy projects. In 2025-2026 Pakistan has actively courted Turkish investment in privatisation, mining, energy, IT, manufacturing and infrastructure, including discussion of government-to-government investment agreements, per Pakistani press reporting (Profit/Pakistan Today, July 2026).
Pakistan and Turkiye are both founding-era members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which provides a regional framework (alongside Iran and Central Asian states) for trade and transport corridor cooperation, including the long-discussed Istanbul-Tehran-Islamabad (ITI) rail/road corridor concept, though the ITI freight train service has historically been intermittent rather than a reliable regular link. Direct air connectivity exists via national and private carriers between Pakistani cities and Istanbul/Ankara. Energy cooperation centers on Turkish renewable-energy investment (Zorlu wind/solar) rather than any cross-border pipeline or grid link, given the lack of geographic contiguity.
Defense cooperation is the most substantive dimension of the relationship, headlined by the MILGEM-class corvette program (four ships, jointly built/technology-transferred, with the first launched during President Alvi's August 2021 visit) and a long-troubled but still-referenced deal for 30 T129 ATAK attack helicopters (worth roughly $1.5 billion), which has faced years of delay because the US has withheld export licenses for the helicopters' LHTEC T800 engines, reportedly pushing Pakistan to explore Chinese alternatives. The two air forces and armies conduct regular joint exercises (Anatolian Eagle air exercises since 2004; Ataturk-XI 2021 counter-terrorism exercise). Culturally, Turkish soft power has been highly visible in Pakistan, most notably the popularity of the Turkish historical drama 'Dirilis: Ertugrul' (promoted publicly by former PM Imran Khan), alongside education cooperation via the Türkiye Maarif Foundation, which took over the Pak-Turk school network (28 schools handed over in 2018) after Pakistan designated the Gulen movement (FETO) a terrorist organization at Ankara's request.
This page is compiled from open-source, primarily official material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan / Pakistan Bureau of Statistics trade data, embassy statements, and joint communiqués), cross-checked against reputable news reporting. Figures and dates are marked as unverified where a primary source could not be confirmed. This tracker is a living document and is updated as new agreements, visits, or data are published.
Disclaimer: This tracker presents open-source research compiled by the IPDS Centre for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies research desk. It does not represent an official position of the Government of Pakistan, and does not constitute an endorsement by IPDS of any state's position on unresolved disputes referenced herein.