Pakistan-Turkmenistan relations are defined overwhelmingly by energy and connectivity ambitions — chiefly the long-delayed TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline — rather than by substantial existing trade, which remains minimal. High-level visits (notably President Zardari's October 2024 trip to Ashgabat) have emphasized regional connectivity, energy, and infrastructure corridors, with an Intergovernmental Commission mechanism providing institutional continuity. The relationship is best characterized as a long-term strategic bet on regional connectivity rather than a mature economic partnership.
Pakistan-Turkmenistan relations are defined overwhelmingly by energy and connectivity ambitions — chiefly the long-delayed TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline — rather than by substantial existing trade, which remains minimal. High-level visits (notably President Zardari's October 2024 trip to Ashgabat) have emphasized regional connectivity, energy, and infrastructure corridors, with an Intergovernmental Commission mechanism providing institutional continuity. The relationship is best characterized as a long-term strategic bet on regional connectivity rather than a mature economic partnership.
Embassies: Pakistan maintains an embassy in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan maintains an embassy in Islamabad. Both countries are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Non-Aligned Movement, and Group of 77.
High-level engagement is regular but not frequent, typically anchored around multilateral events and the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation. President Asif Ali Zardari's October 2024 visit to Ashgabat, for the 'Interrelation of Times and Civilizations' international forum, included meetings with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and National Leader Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, and Pakistan's president again visited Ashgabat in December 2025. Foreign-minister-level contact continued into 2026, including a meeting between Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Pakistan's Deputy PM/Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar in New York in May 2026, where preparations for a sixth Intergovernmental Commission session and a bilateral business forum were discussed.
| Agreement | Date | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline framework agreements | 2010s-ongoing | Multilateral intergovernmental framework predating the current period; reaffirmed and revisited repeatedly, including July 2024 commitment to fast-track construction. Original intergovernmental agreement dates to 2010; exact original signing details not re-verified here. |
| Turkmenistan-Pakistan Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation (mechanism, multiple sessions) | ongoing | Standing bilateral economic commission; a sixth session was being prepared as of mid-2026. |
| University-level education cooperation agreements (e.g., S.A. Niyazov Agricultural University-University of Agriculture Faisalabad initiative) | 2025 | Sector-specific academic cooperation discussed/initiated; full signing status not independently confirmed. |
Bilateral trade is extremely small and imbalanced toward imports in the most recent fiscal year: Pakistan's exports to Turkmenistan were about $1.96 million and imports from Turkmenistan about $2.79 million in FY2024-25. This is negligible relative to either country's total trade and reflects the absence of direct transport links and the dominance of energy-project diplomacy over actual commodity trade. No evidence of a bilateral free-trade or preferential-trade agreement was found; ECO membership provides the main multilateral trade framework connecting the two.
| Year | Trade volume | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $4.75M | Sum of reported Pakistan export ($1.96m) and import ($2.79m) figures for FY2024-25, as cited in press/secondary reporting; primary State Bank of Pakistan or PBS bilateral trade table not independently retrieved |
Investment: No verifiable data on direct investment flows or named joint ventures between Pakistan and Turkmenistan was found. Cooperation to date is concentrated in state-to-state energy/infrastructure planning (TAPI) rather than private investment.
Energy and transport connectivity is the central pillar of the relationship, dominated by the TAPI gas pipeline, which would carry Turkmen gas roughly 1,800 km through Afghanistan into Pakistan (and onward toward India). As of 2024-2025, the Afghan segment entered construction (September 2024) and Turkmengaz reported completion of a 214 km domestic section, but the project has slipped past several past target dates (2018, 2023, 2024, 2025) and full completion remains unconfirmed. Pakistan and Turkmenistan have also discussed laying power transmission lines and fibre-optic cable along the same Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor, envisioning a combined energy-and-digital corridor, though these remain at the discussion/planning stage.
There is little publicly documented bilateral defense cooperation between Pakistan and Turkmenistan beyond general expressions of support for regional stability; no joint military exercises or defense MoUs were found in available sources. Cultural and educational ties are modest but growing, centered on university-to-university agreements, discussion of an Allama Iqbal commemorative cultural event, and Pakistani student participation in an international mathematics olympiad in Ashgabat.
This page is compiled from open-source, primarily official material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan / Pakistan Bureau of Statistics trade data, embassy statements, and joint communiqués), cross-checked against reputable news reporting. Figures and dates are marked as unverified where a primary source could not be confirmed. This tracker is a living document and is updated as new agreements, visits, or data are published.
Disclaimer: This tracker presents open-source research compiled by the IPDS Centre for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies research desk. It does not represent an official position of the Government of Pakistan, and does not constitute an endorsement by IPDS of any state's position on unresolved disputes referenced herein.