Pakistan-Uzbekistan relations have moved from a low base toward the most substantively active of Pakistan's Central Asian partnerships, driven by shared interest in the Trans-Afghan/Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway corridor and a rapidly expanding schedule of high-level visits culminating in President Mirziyoyev's February 2026 state visit and a new Strategic Partnership. Trade remains modest relative to stated ambitions ($2 billion by 2029/2030) and, like the rest of Pakistan's Central Asia trade, has been badly disrupted by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure since October 2025, which cuts the primary overland route between the two countries.
Pakistan-Uzbekistan relations have moved from a low base toward the most substantively active of Pakistan's Central Asian partnerships, driven by shared interest in the Trans-Afghan/Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway corridor and a rapidly expanding schedule of high-level visits culminating in President Mirziyoyev's February 2026 state visit and a new Strategic Partnership. Trade remains modest relative to stated ambitions ($2 billion by 2029/2030) and, like the rest of Pakistan's Central Asia trade, has been badly disrupted by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure since October 2025, which cuts the primary overland route between the two countries.
Embassies: Pakistan maintains an embassy in Tashkent. Uzbekistan maintains an embassy in Islamabad. Direct commercial air links (Uzbekistan Airways) connect Tashkent with both Islamabad and Lahore.
Since 2022-2023, Pakistan-Uzbekistan diplomacy has intensified markedly, moving from occasional ministerial contact to a dense annual cycle of Bilateral Political Consultations, an Intergovernmental Commission (10th session held February 2026), and reciprocal head-of-government/head-of-state visits. PM Shehbaz Sharif's February 2025 visit to Tashkent was followed within a year by President Mirziyoyev's reciprocal state visit to Islamabad (5-6 February 2026), which produced a Joint Declaration establishing a Strategic Partnership. The relationship is distinguished among Pakistan's Central Asia ties by its heavy substantive focus on a single flagship connectivity project — the Trans-Afghan Railway — rather than purely symbolic exchanges.
| Agreement | Date | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| MoU on Multimodal Transport | 2024-09 | Facilitates seamless transit and trade connectivity between Pakistan and Uzbekistan |
| Framework Agreement of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) Railway Project | 2025-07 | Establishes the Termez-Kharlachi route and joint financing of a feasibility study for a rail corridor linking Uzbekistan to Pakistani seaports via Afghanistan |
| Joint Declaration on the Outcomes of the State Visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Pakistan (Strategic Partnership) | 2026-02 | Elevates bilateral relations, sets $2 billion five-year trade target, and frames business, transport and cultural cooperation |
| Business-community MoUs (textiles, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, mining, tourism) | 2026-02 | Collectively valued at approximately $3.4 billion in prospective business commitments; individual instruments not independently verified |
Trade has grown substantially off a very low base over the past decade but remains modest in absolute terms and is reported inconsistently across sources. Uzbek and Pakistani officials have repeatedly cited ambitious multi-year targets ($2 billion), which imply a multi-fold increase from current levels. The relationship is acutely exposed to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure since October 2025: overland trade between Pakistan and the five Central Asian republics (including Uzbekistan) reportedly fell by over 50% year-on-year in FY2025-26 as the primary transit corridor through Afghanistan shut down, pushing both countries to explore alternative routes via China and Iran.
| Year | Trade volume | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $446M | Uzbek CERR (Center for Economic Research and Reforms) analysis, cited in regional press: bilateral trade reported to have grown 12.2x to reach approximately US$445.9 million by end-2025 — figure not cross-verified against a Pakistani primary source |
| 2025-26 (partial FY) | $88M | Pakistani press reporting citing Ministry of Commerce/SBP-adjacent data: Pakistan's trade with Uzbekistan fell to approximately US$87.7 million in FY2025-26 amid Afghan transit closure — figure should be treated as a partial-year, disruption-affected snapshot rather than a stable annual baseline |
Investment: Investment discussion has moved beyond trade toward proposed manufacturing joint ventures: Uzbekistan has offered to transfer textile enterprises to Pakistani trust management and create leather-industry zones for Pakistani partners, while pharmaceutical talks center on shifting from import-export toward localized manufacturing (Uzbekistan currently imports roughly 70% of its pharmaceutical needs). A Pakistan-Uzbekistan Business Forum operates to facilitate these contacts; the February 2026 visit alone generated MoUs valued at $3.4 billion, though the share representing binding investment versus aspirational intent is unverified.
Connectivity is the centerpiece of the relationship: Uzbekistan views Pakistan's seaports as its shortest route to open water, and the Trans-Afghan/UAP Railway (Termez-Kharlachi-Peshawar-Karachi corridor, roughly 760 km of new track) is the flagship project, expected to cut transit time by around 30% once built. A direct Islamabad-Tashkent and Lahore-Tashkent air link (Uzbekistan Airways) already operates. However, the entire connectivity agenda is currently hostage to the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict: since the border closures beginning in mid-October 2025, the land route the UAP railway would follow has been effectively unusable, and Afghanistan has redirected a growing share of its trade through Iranian and other Central Asian corridors instead of Pakistan, raising questions about the near-term viability of the project's timeline.
Defense cooperation is institutionalized through a bilateral Joint Commission on Security (first convened November 2021) and has become increasingly visible through multinational exercises alongside Turkiye and other Turkic-world partners. Culture and education cooperation draws on shared Persianate/Turkic and Islamic heritage narratives emphasized by both governments, alongside concrete scholarship programs and media/cultural exchange projects, including dubbing of Pakistani television dramas into Uzbek.
This page is compiled from open-source, primarily official material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan / Pakistan Bureau of Statistics trade data, embassy statements, and joint communiqués), cross-checked against reputable news reporting. Figures and dates are marked as unverified where a primary source could not be confirmed. This tracker is a living document and is updated as new agreements, visits, or data are published.
Disclaimer: This tracker presents open-source research compiled by the IPDS Centre for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies research desk. It does not represent an official position of the Government of Pakistan, and does not constitute an endorsement by IPDS of any state's position on unresolved disputes referenced herein.