Pakistan and Azerbaijan describe their relationship as a 'brotherly' and increasingly strategic partnership built on shared Turkic-Islamic cultural affinity, reciprocal solidarity on Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh, and a rapidly deepening defense-industrial relationship. Since 2020 the relationship has moved from largely symbolic to substantive, culminating in Pakistan's largest-ever single defense export contract (JF-17 jets) in 2025. Trade remains marginal relative to the political and defense relationship, though both sides have set ambitious targets to change that.
Pakistan and Azerbaijan describe their relationship as a 'brotherly' and increasingly strategic partnership built on shared Turkic-Islamic cultural affinity, reciprocal solidarity on Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh, and a rapidly deepening defense-industrial relationship. Since 2020 the relationship has moved from largely symbolic to substantive, culminating in Pakistan's largest-ever single defense export contract (JF-17 jets) in 2025. Trade remains marginal relative to the political and defense relationship, though both sides have set ambitious targets to change that.
Embassies: Pakistan's Embassy in Baku opened 12 March 1993; Azerbaijan's Embassy in Islamabad opened 24 August 1997. Pakistan's ambassador in Baku also holds concurrent accreditation to Georgia.
Diplomatic engagement is dense and high-frequency, anchored by a Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) and a Bilateral Political Consultations (BPC) mechanism that both meet regularly, alongside frequent head-of-state and head-of-government visits. Pakistan and Azerbaijan explicitly coordinate positions at the UN and other multilateral fora on Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh respectively. The two countries, together with Turkiye, also operate a trilateral strategic framework (the 2021 Baku Declaration/'Three Brothers' format). Relations were commemorated as a '30 years of diplomatic ties' milestone in 2022, and 2024-25 saw an unusually dense cluster of top-level exchanges.
| Agreement | Date | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| Agreement on Preferential Trade between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan | 2024-07 | Aims to reduce tariff barriers and move toward the $2 billion trade target |
| Agreement on Transit Trade | 2024-07 | Facilitates transit of goods between the two countries via third countries |
| Agreement on Air Transport | 2024-07 | Establishes framework for direct air links and civil aviation cooperation |
| Baku Declaration (Pakistan-Azerbaijan-Turkiye trilateral partnership) | 2021 | Trilateral strategic framework covering defense, connectivity and diplomatic coordination |
Bilateral trade is small in absolute terms and imbalanced in Pakistan's favor, dominated historically by agricultural goods (rice, potatoes) and light manufactures moving to Azerbaijan against fertilizer and mineral products moving to Pakistan, though figures fluctuate significantly year to year and are reported inconsistently across sources. Both governments have repeatedly announced an aspirational target of $2 billion in bilateral trade (set publicly during the July 2024 Aliyev visit), a target that vastly exceeds current volumes, reflecting a gap between political ambition and commercial reality. A Preferential Trade Agreement signed in 2024 is intended to help close this gap.
| Year | Trade volume | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $28.8M | UN Comtrade / OEC bilateral trade data (exports $20.6M, imports $8.2M) |
| 2024 | $11.7M | Trading Economics / UN Comtrade (PK exports to Azerbaijan $11.49M; Azerbaijan exports to PK ~$0.2M) |
| 2025 | $6.1M | Pakistan Ministry of Commerce, FY2024-25 (PK exports $5.05M, PK import payments $1.09M) via mofa.gov.pk |
Investment: During the July 2024 state visit, President Aliyev announced Azerbaijan's intent to invest approximately $2 billion in Pakistan across energy, infrastructure, connectivity and defense-industrial projects; a Pakistan-Azerbaijan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (APJCCI) exists to promote business links, though large-scale realized (as opposed to announced) investment could not be independently verified from primary sources.
Direct air links and an air transport agreement (2024) underpin growing people-to-people and business travel; approximately 90,000 Pakistani tourists visited Azerbaijan in 2025 according to Pakistani MOFA figures. Azerbaijan sits on the Middle Corridor/Trans-Caspian International Transport Route linking Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkiye/Europe, a corridor of Pakistani strategic interest for alternative trade connectivity, though no dedicated Pakistan-specific transit agreement tied to this corridor was identified. Energy cooperation (oil/gas sector expertise, given Azerbaijan's SOCAR hydrocarbons sector) has been discussed at the political level as part of the announced investment package, but no signed, operational energy joint venture could be verified from primary sources.
Defense cooperation is the most substantive dimension of the relationship. It has evolved from personnel exchanges and joint military drills in the early 2000s to Pakistan's largest-ever single defense export: a deal (announced June 2025, reported valued up to $4.6 billion including an associated investment package) for 40 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, with initial aircraft deliveries and a joint 'Indus Shield Alpha' air exercise confirmed by the Pakistan Air Force in October 2025. Both states routinely affirm reciprocal diplomatic solidarity — Azerbaijan backing Pakistan's position on Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan backing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity over Nagorno-Karabakh — a linkage explicitly restated during the July 2024 Aliyev visit. Cultural and educational ties are reinforced by Turkic-Islamic affinity, Azerbaijani government scholarships for Pakistani students, and rising tourist flows.
This page is compiled from open-source, primarily official material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan / Pakistan Bureau of Statistics trade data, embassy statements, and joint communiqués), cross-checked against reputable news reporting. Figures and dates are marked as unverified where a primary source could not be confirmed. This tracker is a living document and is updated as new agreements, visits, or data are published.
Disclaimer: This tracker presents open-source research compiled by the IPDS Centre for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies research desk. It does not represent an official position of the Government of Pakistan, and does not constitute an endorsement by IPDS of any state's position on unresolved disputes referenced herein.