Pakistan-Tajikistan relations are framed around a Strategic Partnership (established 2021) emphasizing security, energy and connectivity, most visibly through the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project nearing completion. The relationship has a dense visit calendar (multiple PM-level visits in 2024-2025 alone) but trade remains very small in absolute terms — among the smallest of Pakistan's three Central Asian relationships covered here — and, like the region generally, has been hit hard by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure since October 2025, which one report indicates cut Pakistan-Tajikistan trade by nearly 70%.
Pakistan-Tajikistan relations are framed around a Strategic Partnership (established 2021) emphasizing security, energy and connectivity, most visibly through the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project nearing completion. The relationship has a dense visit calendar (multiple PM-level visits in 2024-2025 alone) but trade remains very small in absolute terms — among the smallest of Pakistan's three Central Asian relationships covered here — and, like the region generally, has been hit hard by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure since October 2025, which one report indicates cut Pakistan-Tajikistan trade by nearly 70%.
Embassies: Pakistan opened its embassy in Dushanbe in 1993. Tajikistan opened a Consulate General in Islamabad in 1997, upgraded to a full embassy on 23 February 2005; Tajikistan also maintains a Consulate General in Karachi.
Pakistan and Tajikistan elevated relations to a Strategic Partnership in September 2021 during PM Imran Khan's visit to Dushanbe, building on declarations dating to 2017-2018. Since then the relationship has sustained a regular rhythm of Bilateral Political Consultations (6th round held September 2025) and reciprocal visits, including PM Shehbaz Sharif's bilateral visit in July 2024 and his participation in Tajikistan's High-Level International Conference on Glaciers' Preservation in May 2025. The agenda consistently centers on energy (CASA-1000), connectivity to Pakistani seaports, defense/security (including counter-terrorism given shared concerns about Afghanistan), and trade — with trade the least developed pillar relative to stated ambition.
| Agreement | Date | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| Establishment of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan | 2021-09 | Framework covering security, mutual trust, countering shared threats, regional stability, and political/economic/humanitarian cooperation; builds on 2017 and 2018 declarations |
| CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project) intergovernmental framework | multi-year, ongoing since ~2016 construction start | Joint venture between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to transmit up to 1,000 MW of surplus Tajik/Kyrgyz hydropower to Pakistan |
| Three-year trade roadmap ($200 million target) | 2026-06 | Agreed at the 8th Joint Commission Meeting to raise bilateral trade from its current low base |
| 12 accords covering trade, anti-corruption, infrastructure, education and culture (cited in earlier bilateral visits) | circa 2021 | Broad-based cooperation package signed around the time of the Strategic Partnership declaration; individual instrument names not independently verified |
Trade is the weakest pillar of the relationship in absolute terms, running in the tens of millions of dollars annually with a large surplus in Pakistan's favor, and figures vary noticeably across the sources found, indicating no single authoritative current figure could be confirmed. Both governments have acknowledged this underperformance and set a modest three-year target of $200 million (2026), a level Pakistan already exceeds with several other Central Asian states. The October 2025 Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure has been especially damaging here, since Tajikistan's overland trade with Pakistan depends entirely on transit through Afghanistan; one regional outlet reported bilateral trade fell by nearly 70% as a direct result.
| Year | Trade volume | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024-25 | $29M | Pakistani government figures cited in press reporting: bilateral trade of approximately US$29 million (exports ~US$26 million, imports ~US$3.16 million) for fiscal year 2024-25 |
| 2023 | $53M | Alternative figure cited in press reporting: Pakistan exports of ~US$48.94 million and imports of ~US$3.8 million for calendar year 2023 — this figure and the FY2024-25 figure above come from different reports and could not be reconciled against a single primary SBP/PBS release; treat both as approximate |
Investment: Investment cooperation is at an early, largely aspirational stage, discussed mainly through Joint Working Groups on oil/gas, energy, education and tourism, and a nominal Joint Business Council. No large verified joint-venture or FDI figures were found; hydropower (via CASA-1000) is the one area of concrete, if not yet fully operational, capital cooperation.
Energy is the single most substantive area of Pakistan-Tajikistan cooperation: the CASA-1000 project will transmit Tajik (and Kyrgyz) surplus summer hydropower to Pakistan via Afghanistan, and Tajik officials have targeted completion by end-2026 with commercial operation expected in 2027. Pakistan recently negotiated down contractor claims on its side of the project, saving over $27 million. Broader transport connectivity — road/rail links from Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Karachi and Gwadar — has been discussed in strategic-partnership documents since 2021 but, like similar plans with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, is currently stalled by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border closure and conflict since October 2025, since Afghanistan is the only overland route between the two countries.
Defense cooperation is real but narrower than with Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, centered on Pakistani arms sales to Tajikistan and training exchanges rather than large joint exercises; both countries share an interest in Afghanistan-related security given Tajikistan's own long, historically tense border and ethnic-Tajik ties to northern Afghanistan. Culture and education cooperation is modest, resting on military and civilian training placements and general references to cooperation in education/tourism working groups, without evidence of large-scale scholarship programs or diaspora ties comparable to Uzbekistan's.
This page is compiled from open-source, primarily official material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan / Pakistan Bureau of Statistics trade data, embassy statements, and joint communiqués), cross-checked against reputable news reporting. Figures and dates are marked as unverified where a primary source could not be confirmed. This tracker is a living document and is updated as new agreements, visits, or data are published.
Disclaimer: This tracker presents open-source research compiled by the IPDS Centre for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies research desk. It does not represent an official position of the Government of Pakistan, and does not constitute an endorsement by IPDS of any state's position on unresolved disputes referenced herein.